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SECRET

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PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

Langley, Virginia

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and transcribed under her direction.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Commission:

GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

- - -

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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P R O C E E D I N G S

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the record?

A William C. Sturbitts.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and Waiver"?

A Right.

Q You understand that document is still in effect?

A Sure.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

A You mean the Agency or --

Q That is right.

A Central Intelligence Agency.

Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

your employment with the Agency?

A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans, which is now the Directorate of Operations.

Q What year were you put on that detail?

A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

Q And what did that detail involve?

A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

Q And how long were you on that detail?

A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

Q Between 1964 and 1973?

A (Nods in affirmative.)

Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

A Yes, January.

Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

A Yes.

Q Were you stationed in Washington?

A Yes.

Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

A Yes.

Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected with the operations of the Miami Station?

A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide. I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

Q Run out of --

A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones were run out of Europe.

Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the operations of the Miami base?

A Yes.

Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

A Yes, sir.

Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami Station?

A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know it. Well, I will come back to that.

Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.

Q What years was he Chief?

A I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline. He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which you were assigned for the 9-year period?

A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations Group.

Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was it attached to one of the area divisions?

A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And that -- when Harvey left, he went to Chief of Station, Rome, and Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff. It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the Deputy Director, Plans.

Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?

A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.

Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the Bay of Pigs?

A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around -- in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in September, something like that, 1961.

Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities Staff?

A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went back into the Western Hemisphere Division.

Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then later DDP.
Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr. Harvey held after he left Task Force W?
A Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.
Q And is he still with the Agency?
A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.
Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?
A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives. He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm. Harvey is a lawyer.
Q Indianapolis area?
A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest, Indiana.
Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force W?
A It was the overall Cuban operations.
Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station established?
A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.
Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?
A Oh, yes.
Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

Station running any operations against Cuba?

A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

Q Yes.

A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type thing.

Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban operations?

A Yes.

Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami Station?

A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

A Right, except that at the present time the Station has no Cuban operations.

Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations terminated?

A At the Station? Let's see. Sternfield went down there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

Q And have those operations been terminated entirely or are they now run out of the Washington area?

A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of the Washington area?

A Right.

Q Is that correct?

A Right. Worldwide.

Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassination attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination attempts that have been mounted --

A Right.

Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such attempts?

A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too strong a word.

Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of any such discussions?

A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions, I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgerald in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian rifles and

a telescopic sight.

Q Who wanted them?

A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representative of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

You said there were 19 volumes of documents with respect to this.

A 19 files, manila.

Q All having to do with possible assassination?

A All having to do with this whole time period and -- can we go off the record for a minute?

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr. Fitzgerald?

A I simply overheard it, that is right.

Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

heard?

A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time, in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

Q This was in Paris?

A Yes.

Q I see.

Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff. He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with Cuban military-type.

Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received instructions with respect to this activity from another component of the Government?

A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision. And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided, he did a number of things.

Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro was discussed?

A No, not really.

Q You referred to this as the first occasion.

A This is the first --

Q Was there a second?

A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it discussed.

Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came to your attention after this discussion in the garden in Paris?

A The only other thing that came to my attention was that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but that is what I was told.

Q When did you learn that?

A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964, around February, something like that.

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by the name of Frank Sturgis?

A Indeed.

Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in the press?

A No. It is what is contained in the files.

Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files, particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division, in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any connection with the Agency?

A I have.

Q What were the results of that search?

A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about an employment relationship?

A That is what I am speaking of.

Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of the Agency?

A No.

Q Was he ever a contract employee?

A No.

Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

A No.

Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the Agency?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against Cuba?

A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this Agency.

Q How did you learn of those operations?

A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.

Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?

A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and by the Bureau office in Miami.

Q Do you know who financed his activities?

A I have no idea.

Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were indirectly financed by the Agency through --

A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr. Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

Q And what is the volume of that material?

A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee called for them the other day after the article in the paper, I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and they returned them Monday afternoon.

Q Do you know who examined those files?

A No, I don't.

Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits of so-called information.

Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged narcotics traffic?

A Recently it has been.

Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office in Miami?

A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI.

Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an established contact?

A No manner.

Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to collect information from Mr. Sturgis?

A I can't speak to that but the records that we have don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin American Division before they did anything since we do hold the file.

Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?

A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any information relating to an individual appearing in the press as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.

Q Personnel or personality file?

A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.

Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?

A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know each other. They have to know each other from their days in Cuba.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?

A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run, sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs to the Agency.

Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting together his own crew?

A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have some people in the Key West base. But he, Martinez, would receive his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis along on any of these operations?

A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.

Q And that would be for a period of time between Shackley and Henze?

A Yes.

Q 1964 to 1966?

A Something like that.

Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during your 9-year tenure with those groups.

A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about the breadth of the thing.

Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?

A Right.

Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary operations. Were these operations run out of southern Florida?

A Right.

Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of the country that participated in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami that were used in these activities?

A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As I said, we did have a Key West base.

Q Were there any other bases in that area of the country that were utilized in these operations?

A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have training facilities for the UDT teams.

Q What is a UDT team?

A Underwater demolition.

Q Where were those bases located?

A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys, along that long peninsula going down there. There were a number of sites. I really can't recall them.

Q Were there any other sites within the United States in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people participating in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Where were these people trained?

A What do you mean?

Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.

A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys. Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained at the Domestic Training Station.

Q Where is that located?

A That is down in Virginia.

Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these raids?

A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to understand at this time that we had a great many contract employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another entity of the --

Q DDO?

A DDO.

Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about, training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special Operations Group, is that correct?

A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would probably staff the training facility with their people who have the expertise in paramilitary operations.

Q Now, were the people that were being trained at these facilities basically Cuban refugees?

A Yes.

Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people were American citizens?

A No.

Q Or had become American citizens.

A I would assume a great many have.

Q By this time.

A By this time, yes.

Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community in Miami? Do you have any idea?

A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a military people.

Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert action. How do you distinguish between those two categories of activities?

A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was -- they were stolen,in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.

We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.

He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

type of thing.

Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?

A Yes, covert action.

Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-type operations?

A Yes.

Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

A Yes.

Q What other types of harassment activities did you run that would fall under this covert action category?

A Well --

Q Would economic warfare be --

A That was sort of something separate unto itself. This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

Q What special group is that?

A It is now called the Forty Committee.

Q Is that 302 Committee?

A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all, it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between there and now it is the Forty Committee.

Q All right. We will return to that a little bit later, but what other types of harassment were you running against Castro --

A This is what I was trying to think of.

Q -- that would be considered covert action?

A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement, media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't remember. I know we had a number of things going against him. We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply, particularly when they were countries that we had treaties with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.

Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you referring to?

A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of Commerce, the Export Control people.

I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

executives of these American companies and ask them to tell their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts and the other things that Castro might need. We had the Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S. companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry. We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated effort to really isolate them.

Q All right. And that is what you were referring to as moral suasion?

A Yes.

Q Anything else in that category?

A Not really. None that I can think of.

Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign companies?

A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless, the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops to stop that sale. The British Government turned us down flat.

Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of supply?

A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing program. If there was a single source of supply for a particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

the market.

Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

A Yes.

Q -- domestic market?

A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

Q In all cases?

A The cases that I was associated with, it was all sold abroad.

Q What kind of purchases were made?

A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased some Bright Stock in Antwerp.

Q What?

A Bright Stock.

Q What is that?

A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar, melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually sold in Africa.

Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

A No.

Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of supply to Cuba?

A Well, we did provide through third country agents who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.

Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?

A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact, the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des. and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.

Q Mr. Dillon?

A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.

Q But --

A But you must remember that these American --

Q Mr. Connors?

A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturers, well, their places were nationalized and they were only too happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona fide business. These things were transshipped through two or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.

Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.

A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know it was one of the parts of the program.

Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are referring to?

A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a gray area some place.

Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international law, the laws of the United States?

A I would have to go back and review the thing. I really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.

Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?

A I would think probably down in the Records Center some place.

Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some time during the lunch hour?

A No. It is forty miles away.

Q Well, is there some place in the building where you could refresh your memory?

A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped. This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material has been retired.

Q What category of activity would we be talking about

when we refer to extra-legal activities?

A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.

I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.

Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.

A All right.

Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?

A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.

Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection with the economic program?

A Yes.

Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?

A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.

Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?

A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q These were essentially foreign publications?

A Yes.

Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?

A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?

A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

Q For broadcasts to what areas?

A For broadcasts to Havana.

Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?

A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.

Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.
A Reach Cuba.
Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to as Swan. Were there others?
A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami, I think, and one down in Key West that they used.
Q Where was Radio Swan located?
A On Swan Island.
Q Where is Swan Island?
A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.
Q As far as you can recall, were there any other radio stations in the United States that were utilized to broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?
A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that I recall right now.
Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American public to support those propaganda activities?
A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.
Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?
A Oh, yes.
Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

Cuban propaganda?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q And that would include both the publications and the radio?

A Right.

Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day, this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he could.

So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a

real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.

Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?

A Oh, yes.

Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?

A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?

A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.

Q They were used as consultants,basically.

A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

Q We have spoken about the investment American business had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American organized crime --

A No.

Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

Q The casinos were run --

A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this type of thing.

Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

A It was a criminal element.

Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

A Right.

Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

A No.

Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

A Oh, yes.

Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

of years ago.

Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's name?

A Yes, as I recall.

Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

Q In connection with --

A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

Q In connection with the casinos or --

A No.

Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

A No.

Q You know of no instance in which organized crime figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures of that type --

A No.

Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

A No.

Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's Cuba?

A Well, we used all-source information to find out what his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned by the General Services Administration, finally got back into production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked into the thing and indeed they did.

Q Who owned the mine?

A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it over.

Q I see.

A General Services Administration. And it was leased out for operation. But the ownership rested with the Government.

So the Treasury simply made the French provide a Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this

country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel found other sources and export privileges to the United States were restored.

You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that simple.

Q Were there any other instances that you can recall of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of American business firms?

A I know we were in touch with a great many American business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of any other such instances?

A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time with their Maritime fleet,such as it was. These boats were powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us,which

they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's representatives around the world if they got any orders from the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.

We did the same thing with --

Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?

A No.

Q Were they compensated for the loss of business involved in that activity?

A No. No.

Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from other companies.

A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.

Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in that manner?

A No. Not a one.

Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any companies?

A No. No.

Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with Cuba?

A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot -- foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country. And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried to twist their arm.

Q Other than insuring that these companies refused to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did you receive from American business?

A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in some instances they might call me and I would just give them a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.

Q Any other types of support solicited or received by the Agency from American business?

A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough, that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but

outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of cooperation. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.

Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --

A Yes.

Q -- in dealings with these companies?

A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.

Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started but didn't really discuss that in any depth.

What kind of paramilitary operations were run against Cuba by the CIA?

A Maritime operations.

Q Is that the extent of it?

A That is the extent of it.

Q Were there any aerial operations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Leaflet drops?

A No.

Q Bombing?

A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.

Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q Aerial photography, and so forth.

A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

be requested and that is about it.

Q And those were run out of the United States?

A Oh, yes.

Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-military activity other than maritime operations.

A No. I really can't, no.

Q Am I correct that those operations were manned by CIA contract employees?

A Right.

Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

A Right.

Q And some CIA officers?

A Right.

Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services, involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we probably have people on detail from other -- from the military branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also had people detailed into the Agency.

Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the United States and in part outside of the United States. Is that correct?

A I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.

Q The Keys would be considered within the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?

A Following the Bay of Pigs,I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.

Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?

A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.

Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?

A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.

Q Why was the program terminated?

A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.

Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.

A Yes.

Q What do you mean by that?

A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify him and capture him.

Q These various types of paramilitary operations that were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the Forty Committee?

A Every operation received a specific approval from the Forty Committee.

Q In advance?

A In advance.

Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for initiating such an operation?

A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil. or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.

Q You are referring to a cache of arms.

A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries, whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have one of these operations and the request would go from here over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper phase for communications and this type of thing. And these things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire thing was coordinated.

Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?

A No.

Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking about?

A You are not talking about a very big volume of operations because of the planning that had to go into these things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.

Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having run 300 operations.

A I have seen that.

Q Is that inaccurate?

A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore before you go. So he may have considered that all these training exercises were operations but no way did he ever participate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.

Q Now, from what specific locations were these operations launched?

A They were mostly launched from the Keys.

Q Any other locations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and run sabotage operations that were conducted?

A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against the Texaco refinery.

Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?

A What used to be the Texaco refinery.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery. We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type of operation that we did.

As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and exfiltrations.

Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him back. He wouldn't walk.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out of the Keys other than what you have just described?

A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down crank cases. Things of this nature.

One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.

The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to extend the credit.

The railroad system was in total disaster. The Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment because they were used to good American equipment. And these were principal targets that we were trying to get to.

Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run from a base in the United States?

A No.

Q I know there has been some paramilitary training in the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q In connection with other operations.

A Oh, sure.

Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that were actually run out of the United States?

A No.

Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique situation.

A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.

Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.

A That is right.

Q What kind of equipment did these people have?

A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers, rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun anything. They were extremely well armed. We had our underwater demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.

Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover in the Miami area?

A Yes.

Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one firm?

A No. Variety.

Q Fishing companies?

A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine supply. In all, I think during the period that the station and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any legitimate commercial activities?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with firms in that area?

A These are probably what we would call devised facilities. They were probably registered with the State of Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of existence and started up a new one.

Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running these operations?

A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys. Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He came back -- he might come back once a month, or something like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks if he got some time off.

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Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were actually stationed full-time in the Keys.

A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.

Q Were there any operations run out of the United States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of sugar or anything of that sort?

A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the Puerto Rican thing?

A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind. Would you describe that for me?

A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.

In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the individual, and some of this was done. And then when it leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar firm buy it back from the Soviets.

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Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

A Yes.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other operations in which crops were -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

A No. No.

Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

A In Cuban products?

Q Yes.

A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel. The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving. There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there. I forget -- several other European and American companies that had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experimenting with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this type of thing.

But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade and cut off his sources of supply.

Q When was the Miami Station established?

A As a station?

Q Yes.

A I think in September 1961.

Q And that was several years before you became involved in Cuban matters?

A Yes.

Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature within the United States, Agency facilities?

A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

Q Yes.

A A station as such?

Q Yes.

A No. You have some communications facilities that you really call stations because here again, they are not

directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of overseas communications.

Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and Office of Security officers, and so forth.

A Right.

Q But I am talking about actual stations.

A Operating stations, no.

Q This is the only such station in the United States as far as you know, is that correct?

A Right.

Q And was this station established to deal primarily with Cuban activities?

A Yes.

Q Cuban-related matters?

A With Cuba, period.

Q Did it have, when it was established, any other responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?

A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other countries in the Hemisphere.

Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban activities, what was the size or the number of personnel attached to that Station?

A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a couple

couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees, independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its height it had over 500 people in it.

Q Full-time Agency people?

A No, no.

Q Combination of contract and --

A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a staff employee.

Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract people?

A Yes.

Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?

A Oh, yes.

Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in Miami? Physical facilities.

A Well, they were located on the south campus of the University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.

Q Official cover?

A No. Non-official.

Q Non-official cover. What was the cover?

A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.

Q Engaging in any business?

A No.

Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community, how long could a non-official cover last?

A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing, for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.

Q Yes, I understand.

A So it was a research activity and the only people that ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumerable other covers with different activities. The guard force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

Q And this particular Station, then, was under the supervision of the group we have been discussing?

A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.

Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume responsibilities for the Miami Station?

A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.

Q Is there presently a Miami Station?

A Oh, yes.

Q And how large is it at the present time?

A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present time because we are in one of these periods where we are reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.

Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions were being performed by the Miami Station?

A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this type of thing. Covert action.

Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in the deposition?

A Yes.

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Q Which of these activities, if any of them were actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?

A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably counterintelligence.

Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence activities in the Miami area?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counter-intelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?

A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a reception center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation. The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would look at the forms and based on previous experience or what they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they might have some information of intelligence value, they would reinterrogate them.

It was in this manner that this gal came to our knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined that obviously she was receiving messages and she was sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillance on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved in.

Q Were there many activities of that type?

A Not really. You have got to remember that the Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, something like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty negative. This was one of the reasons that obviously from -- in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting to Case Officers and they would report on things in the community, of people they thought were suspect and this type of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved in CI activity.

Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

activities in that area was primarily a function of the overwhelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability to properly staff the thing?

A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a relationship there that had gone over a period of years between the Agency and the Bureau.

MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.)

- - -

AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world.

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

A. Cuban exiles.

Q. How large an outfit were the AMOTS?

A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

Q. Go ahead.

A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

A. No.

Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami Station?

A. Right.

Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were -- they were being subsidized by the Agency. They were employed by two cover companies, the largest of which was called Latin American Social and Economic Research. Then we had another smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under another cover, commercial cover, -- I just don't recall what it was. But these peop.e ostensibly were employees of these wholly owned proprietaries of the Agency. They were duly constituted, incorporated, paid taxes, all this type of thing.

Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly, were paid by the CIA?

A. That is right.

Q. And was training provided them by the Agency?

Q. Oh, yes.

A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made up the AMOTS conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

A. Right.

Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to debriefings?

A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their time here had acquired new information.

Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings conducted?

A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa Loca.

Q. That is the Air Base?

A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any interference and this type of thing.

Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

A. You mean in terms of years?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course -- we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

Q. I see.

A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just terminated that part of the activity.

Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other intelligence gathering functions --

A. No.

Q. In the community?

A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could have been used to debrief people within the community, within the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people were directly under his control. Though the organization as it was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing, but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer.

Of course, if these people went out and did something on their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously. You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they leave, we don't know what they are up to.

Q. Did they have CIA credentials?

A. No sir, because they were proprietary hires of this commercial cover.

Q. Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing capacity, I should say?

A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions, morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when these people were cebriefed and the debriefer wrote up the report, it would be sent from the AMOTS over to the Station. If the debriefing report contained something of positive intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot down some additional requirements and ask that that person be recontacted and asked specific questions.

Q. Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this smaller broup of AMOTS do for the Agency in the Miami area?

A. This was their prime purpose.

Q. How large was that particular group?

A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside, I think there were about five debriefers with the support people which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15 in that group, if there were that many.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in resettling Cuban emigres?

A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

A. Health, Education and Welfare.

Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were processed through the Center and then they had a place down on Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and care for them in Freedom House.

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Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do with that whatsoever.

Q. Turning back to the AMOTS, and to the larger of the two groups, what was the name of that group again?

A. SASER, Latin American Social and Economic Research.

Q. We can call them LASER for short?

A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated the two groups was for security because we had one group housed over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so that is why we took the smaller establishment to preserve some cover.

Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged in?

A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every refugee that came through the reception center. They provided -- they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

The information these people collected as opposed to the information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That came from -- all the information they had came from human sources

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or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

A. Yes.

Q. For each Cuban refugee?

A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget, we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens of thousands, I would think.

Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

A. No way.

Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determination?

A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can become nationalized out in California and your record of nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for two years. That is how far they are behind.

Q. So I take it --

A. So there is no central index you can go to. I mean, there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who are now American citizens?

A. Absolutely true.

Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain derogatory information about the individuals involved?

A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment,we would ask that all the information on that individual be assembled so that we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know, everything right down the line. In case of some of the more important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared where we had enough information. But this is one of the things these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would start looking through the papers or anything else to come up with anything they could on what the guy's current activities are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.

Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence service of Cuba?

A. Right.

Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function in addition to recruitment of agents?

A. Right.

Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence, gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the traditional skills, is that correct?

A. That is about right.

Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

purposes other than recruitment?

A. Well --

Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible internal security problem?

A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We would simply task them with through your sources what do you have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we wanted the information on anybody.

Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to make generalizations about the kind of information that is in those files?

A. Well, that is right.

Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as derogatory information?

A. I would assume so.

Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects of those files may now be American citizens?

A. Right.

Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to study that particular situation?

A. WEll, we did make an effort to do it at one time.

You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel, whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with what the machine system had to see if there was updated information in the machine system that would show that this guy had become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --

Q. Excuse me, off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are presently here in Washington?

A. The cards and what is left of the files.

Q. That is the soft cover files?

A. Yes.

Q. And --

A. I assume they are either here or down at the Records Center.

Q. And where is the computer system?

A. You mean our machine system? We have --

Q. The machine here that you tried to match up with the

information on the cards?

A. Right down on the third floor.

Q. That is not the hydro system?

A. Oh, no, no.

Q. This is a separate --

A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division uses this particular system.

Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

The AMOTS are still in existence, aren't they?

A. No.

Q. I thought they were going out in June.

A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

Q. I see.

A. But they have all been let go. They were let go -- they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to go find a job.

Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in Miami at this time?

A. no.

Q. So there are no records in Miami?

A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

Q. Did the AMOTS have law enforcement responsibilities in the Miami community?

A. No. No.

Q. Any affiliation with law enforcement groups?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. What else did they do, this larger group of AMOTS that was not doing debriefings?

A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere to train some of the local services in those countries. They served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in listening posts where we had audio --

Q. Foreign listening posts?

A. Oh, yes, foreign.

Q. Any domestic listening posts?

A. No, no.

Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance conducted by them.

Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record, I don't know where it could be.

Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard and Customs and in general the law enforcement US. Government

agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they started to tighten up.

I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau, this type of thing.

Q. These people were arrested?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Prosecuted?

A. Not really.

Q. Any of them American citizens?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?

A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here. He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted but he was always walking around Miami when I was there. So

I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went to jaul or not.

Q. Other than identifying operations by militant anti-Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS engage in?

A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence -- I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence. interest at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.

Q. Cubans were?

A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.

Q. Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?

A. With the Bureau, yes.

Q. Because of their manpower limitations you folks were in a better position to do it?

A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big factor.

Q. And this was conducted through the AMOTS?

A. Yes.

Q. How substantial was the counterintelligence operation in the community?

A. WEll, it wasn't that big. They identified not what I

would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities were they engaging in?

A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in electronic intercept.

Q. Where was that done?

A. Down in Florda, down in Homestead.

Q. This is Southeast of Homestead?

A. Yes.

Q. What ere they intercepting?

A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the commo. for the infiltration.

As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made available to intercept Cuban communications. NSA tasks them with the frequencies they wanted covered and the Cuban Communications nets they wanted covered, such as the border guards. Another important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards, sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior network they covered too. But all electronic intercept coverage is dictated by NSA.

Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin requirements on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in what NSA has an interest in and unless there were one particular operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans were doing, then we would task our people with that.

For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was. But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the boat in an African port, I mean the intercept operators did, when it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200 Cuban troops.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Were the communications they were intercepting exclusively foreign communications?

A. Exclusively foreign communications.

Q. Were they intercepting any communications, one terminus of which was the United States?

A. No.

Q. These were basically Cuban Government communications?

A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I understand that a study of the history of the AMOTS has been prepared by one of your members.

A. That is right.

Q. What is his name?

A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have to get that for you.

Q. What is the title of the study?

A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The AMOT Organization."

Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

A. It was done when Paul Hennessey was down there. What we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

Q. I see.

A. At intervening periods of time.

Q. When was this particular report prepared, the AMOTS?

A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And purports to be a fairly complete history of the

activities of the AMOTS?

A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using this gent..

Q. First started using what?

A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activities?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

A. Okay.

Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you this. There have been some allegations in the press that prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents of the CIA.

Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn the examination over to him for whatever time he needs.

MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Can you begin, since I have not been in on the beginning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts, by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

Q. Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

Q. And who was his immediate superior?

A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

Q. Deputy Director for Plans?

A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

Q. What period of time are we talking about now?

A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. So you were not involved in this Special Activities Group during the 1959 to '61 period?

A. No.

Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all during the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

Q. Mr. Hunt has stated in his interviews and in his

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published materials that he was the person who was in charge of organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall where that was?

A. That could be quite true.

Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particularly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?

A. Yes.

Q. Or Frank Fiorini?

A. There is no relationship.

Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any nature with Frank Sturgis?

A. To my knowledge that is true.

Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?

A. Extremely emphatic.

Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that he was never a contract agent of the Agency?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity of being an informer or informant to the Agency?

A. It is possible that he could have been a source.

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Q. YOu mean a source of --

A. Source of information of another agent. Another agency agent.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but it is entirely possible that that could have happened without being a matter of record.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance whatever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, nothing.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or indirectly by the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, no.

Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all, can you tell us when that began in 1963?

A. When the Special Activities Group --

Q. No. When your contact with the Special Activities

Group began?

A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being sponsored by the Agency?

A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

Q. Yes.

A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency or the U.S. Government.

Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear to be otherwise?

A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface itself.

Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr. Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be involved in the CIA organizations?

A. Yes.

Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere in the United States? I am asking now particularly with reference to New Orleans.

A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was sort of a sideshow to Miami.

Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?

A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through New Orleans.

Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean by that?

A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of income for them to continue what they were doing. A great number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select people were -- well, they were selected and then they were talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or whatever you might have of some of these organizations in order

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to get the funding through to the organizations.

These people were normally prominent people and --

Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is the way the funding went into the fronts.

Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people in New Orleans?

A. I would think so. I believe so.

Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance to Cubans or Cuban groups?

A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had a great many people that did this.

Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a funding source?

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A. This I do not know either.

Q. Pardon?

A. This I don't know.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Where would that information be available?

A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

Q. Is he in the building?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his name?

A. Bill Kent.

Q. Bill Kent'

A. Yes.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Who is Bill Kent with now? Which department?

A. He is still with the DDO.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I think Career Management Group Staff.

Q. Is he officed near you?

A. No. He is down in the basement.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were that were used to provide funds to the --

A. Oh, yes.

Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whehter -- do you know the identity of any of them in New Orleans?

A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took llace in New Orleans.

Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern United States, talked about and believed that they were involved in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

A. That is right.

Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in the southern United States about plans or prospects for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they blamed it all on one man.

Q. That is Fiedl Castrc?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

A. Yes.

Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries engaged --

A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

A. No.

Q. Never met him?

A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

Q. You would not have known anything about his whereabouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

A. Can we go off the record?

(Off the record discussion.)

THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. I would like to have it on the record.

A. Do you have a particular day?

Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on any particular day.

A. No.

Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing, but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

day to the next where he was?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes.

Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

Q. Was this just fairly recently?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr. Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but that the records were not available as to how much sick leave or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

A. Well --

Q. Am I mistaken?

A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day. I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer. He is the chap that got that for me.

Q. Can you check that for us?

A. Sure.

Q. And give us the results of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Because this is much more detailed information than I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the Agency.

A. All right. I will do that.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

A. Let me have a piece of paper.

Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which is 351-5106.

THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. That is the day.

A. 1963.

Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation made?

A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether -- I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the inquiry?

A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully.

Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of European Division.

Q. When was that inquiry received?

A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. About the first time these photographs began to be circulated?

A. Yes.

Q. About the bums in Dallas?

A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was Chief of Station, London, for a long time and he apparently made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm Magazine?

A. That is right.

Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who have the contact with the Office of Finance.

Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick leave, and then on duty status the following day.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

A. (Nods in negative)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --

A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday or on the next day, Saturday?

A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the 22nd was a Friday.

Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting documents you can find?

A. Okay.

Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

I think that covers the subject matter.

MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want. Can you think of anything else?

MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.

MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I am sorry for the interruption but over the long I think probably I saved you some time.

We are talking about newspaper editors when we were interrupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ough to be fair.

Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship w some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was the nature of that relationship?

A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly t Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

Q. What was the purpose of those relationships?

A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relationship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relationship with the press in this town. There were certain things tha might come to the attention of the press involving true names and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any particular time.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami for propaganda purposes?

A. No. No.

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Q Would you know if that were the case?

A No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these people as well as they were assigint us.

Q What assistance would you render for members of the press in Miami?

A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations would give him background briefings and this type of thing on the developments within a given country.

Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami Herald received probably a little more attention than the other papers, principally because it was a large paper and their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout the Hemisphere.

Q Was he also used as a source?

A No.

Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive similar briefings?

A Yes.

Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these organizations?

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A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were principally interested in the leadership of the organizations. Once the organization was established and the leadership took over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess, getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.

Q What were their functions, the fronts?

A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a political organization in exile.

Q Did they conduct any operations?

A No, not that I know of.

Q Just like a political party?

A Like a political party.

Q How many of these fronts were there?

A There were several of them. I really don't remember the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one. And there were some others.

Q The RDF?

A FRD.

Q I see.

A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?

A I would think not. I really don't know.

Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

A No. There was but there isn't any more. There hasn't been one there for years.

Q When was it disbanded?

A I think the station was established around 1958 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it went out of existence in 1958.

Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

Q Do you know what function it was performing?

A (Nods in negative.)

Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked in the Cuban community for the CIA?

A He worked with these fronts, too.

Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the community?

A Intelligence functions. Well --

Q Was he collecting information?

A Sure. If he got information that he thought was worthwhile he would pass it on.

Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

A Yes. He was a contract employee.

Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such contract employees?

A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard, or they were at that time. But here again, you always have ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to be surfaced.

Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in the business of collecting intelligence information in the Cuban communities in Miami.

A Right.

Q Now, I think we finished with the AMOTS but can you think of any other functions performed by the AMOTS that we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?

A No, not really. No.

Q I think you previously described them for me as the eyes and ears into the Cuban community.

A Right.

Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami which was their headquarters, did they not?

A Exactly.

Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to supervise that facility.

A Yes.

Q Now, what has happened to the AMOTS?

A The AMOTS were gradually phased down and will go out of existence -- the AMOTS are out of existence, aren't they? Isn't it the AMDUKES or -- these are the radio people.

Q And the AMDUKES are the AMOTS?

A The AMDUKES are AMOTS but they are radio people.

Q They are the ones that conducted the intercept for NSA?

A Yes. The only reason we use two different names is that in each of these things in those days we had to have a project which had to be renewed every year to get the funding.

Q So AMDUKE and AMOT --

A Synonymous.

Q -- are cryptonyms?

A Yes.

Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. The AM happened at that particular time to be the Cuban diograph.

Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by the Agency to the Secret Service?

A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

Beach where any convention activities were to take place, employees of catering services, limosine service, employees in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it. Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.

Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested all foreign nationals?

A All foreign nationals.

Q Was there any check made to determine whether any of them were American citizens?

A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement that they have identified these people by nationality before we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could not trace.

Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and 1972?

A That is right.

Q And where were these names traced?

A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.

Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

A Through Agency files.

Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI on this as well?

A Oh, yes.

Q And in effect, they were getting an all-Agency name check --

A Right.

Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

A Yes.

Q -- to a candidate?

A Well, they were just trying to determine who might be a security threat.

Q That is right. Potential threat.

A Yes.

Q For what political parties -- strike that.

In 1968 was this service provided for both political conventions?

A Both political conventions.

Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

Q These requests did come from the Secret Service rather than --

A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for

support.

Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to that tracing activity?

A I have all the names that have been traced.

Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

A Yes.

Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there any reason those records have been maintained?

A Well, because we were told to maintain them when the Watergate thing broke.

Q I see.

A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban groups?

A I was not aware of it until I was told of it. I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on the part of these people or whether they were instructed to do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets were located?

A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another place. I forget where it was.

Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these persons were Cubans?

A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized this, which I fully doubt.

Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?

A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony Sforza.

Q Is he still alive?

A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.

Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that. What kind of an investigation have you conducted?

A I have talked to people, which is really all you can do. There is no other way you can do it.

Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone, authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify any of the persons who participated in the picketing?

A No.

Q With what frequency did this activity occur?

A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.

Q This was in New York City?

A New York City and Miami.

Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

the AMOTS engaged in?

A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

Q Any political activity.

Do you know of any other activities that they have conducted within this country, they or any of their members have conducted within this country that we have not already discussed this afternoon?

A No.

Q Any political activities? Any operations?

A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban defectors. In other words, live with them until they are resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of anything else.

Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have been attribited to --

A I have heard of some allegations which have never been proven.

Q What are the allegations?

A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances and this type of thing.

Q Have those allegations been made with any frequency?

A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we made file checks and this type of thing. One particular activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise. These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhattan -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a memory exercise.

Q With what frequency were those kinds of training exercises conducted?

A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained in trade craft.

Q And did their trade craft training include such things as surveillance?

A Sure.

Q And break-ins?

A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinterpreted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they could have walked into your office, your outer office and

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said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it? This is just for observation.

Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have been proven. Have any of them been proved to your satisfaction?

A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.

Q I take it you do not believe they took place other than the training exercise?

A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.

Q Do you know of any instances where members of that group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry in this country?

A No.

Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the Miami Station within this country?

A Legality? No.

Q How about the propriety?

A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up. No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or the propriety of having the Station.

Q There have been some allegations in the press and elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

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A No.

Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various operations in this country.

A You mean this country?

Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type of operation within this country?

A No.

Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

A No.

Q Establishment of businesses?

A No.

Q No?

A No.

Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups, revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre, Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached to Mr. Colby?s statement?

A Yes.

Q Did you have some role in drafting that?

A You mean the Miami Station thing?

Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

A Yes.

Q You wrote it?

A Yes.

Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

A Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize the Hell-out of Juanita Castro.

Q Yes, I am familiar with that.

A You are familiar with all that and that is by the board now, too.

Q She was doing --

A Propaganda.

Q -- propaganda broadcasts.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami

area now by the Miami Station?

A There are no domestic activities at all in the Miami Station. All Cuban activities have been moved back here to Headquarters. The Miami Station now is completely and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

Q Does the Miami Station -- I beg your pardon -- does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have a career agent who has been with us for a good many years in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S. who have relatives in Cuba.

Now, this is done principally with the idea of a recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this type of thing. He does contact these people all over the United States. If we come across an individual that looks like he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him, we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we find out where relatives and these types of people are, we will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or whatever.

Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this country, as access agents.

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A Right.

Q Just like foreign associates would do.

A Exactly.

Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the Miami-Cuban community?

A No. None.

Q That entire apparatus has been --

A Has been dismantled.

Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the Miami Station?

A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14, as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal year.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out of Miami?

A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of Headquarters.

Q And even from the Headquarters location there are no paramilitary operations?

A No.

Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity being conducted still?

A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated now.

Q The Miami Station is under official cover.

A Yes.

Q And it has been decreased to how many people?

A Between 11 and 14.

Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with respect to Cuba?

A Absolutely none.

Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to other Latin American countries?

A To Caribbean countries.

Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are other Agency stations in the Caribbean?

A Yes.

Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts. If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome to do so.

A No, I have nothing.

Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the Commission for your cooperation.

A Sure.

Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

A That is all right.

Q Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the deposition was concluded.)

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